

Formal Methods in Industry

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Formal methods encompass a wide choice of techniques and tools for the specification, development, analysis, and verification of software and hardware systems. Formal methods are widely applied in industry, in activities ranging from the elicitation of requirements and the early design phases all the way to the deployment, configuration, and runtime monitoring of actual systems. Formal methods allow one to precisely specify the environment in which a system operates, the requirements and properties that the system should satisfy, the

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models of the system used during the various design steps, and the code embedded in the final implementation, as well as to express conformance relations between these specifications. We present a broad scope of successful applications of formal methods in industry, not limited to the well-known success stories from the safety-critical domain, like railways and other transportation systems, but also covering other areas such as lithography manufacturing and cloud security in e-commerce, to name but a few. We also report testimonies from a number of representatives from industry who, either directly or indirectly, use or have used formal methods in their industrial project endeavours. These persons are spread geographically, including Europe, Asia, North and South America, and the involved projects witness the large coverage of applications of formal methods, not limited to the safety-critical domain. We thus make a case for the importance of formal methods, and in particular of the capacity to abstract and mathematical reasoning that are taught as part of any formal methods course. These are fundamental Computer Science skills that graduates should profit from when working as computer scientists in industry, as confirmed by industry representatives.

CCS Concepts: • **Software and its engineering** → **Formal methods**; • **Social and professional topics** → **Computer science education**;

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1 Introduction

Formal methods collectively refer to an array of methods for mathematically specifying and verifying computer-system behaviour. In such approaches, systems are interpreted as mathematically precise structures, whether as state machines, as functions mapping initial to final states, or as logical formulas describing system behaviour. Specifications also are given in a mathematically well-founded manner, whether as logical properties or state machines, and the notion of a system satisfying a specification is also given a mathematical definition. Given these elements, formally verifying a system involves constructing a mathematical proof that the system satisfies the specification. The key motivation for these techniques is the strength of the correctness guarantees they provide: in contrast to testing-based and inspection-based techniques, a proof conclusively demonstrates that the system in question, *at the level of abstraction that it is presented*, is correct with respect to its specification. Formal methods complement other verification and validation techniques, such as testing or simulation [169].

Formal methods have been studied in the computing community since at least the 1960s, with seminal work by Floyd [133], Hoare [170], and Dijkstra [113] defining techniques for proving programs correct. Later work by Pnueli, Lamport, Clarke, Emerson, and others considered the automated verification of state machines *vis à vis* properties in temporal logics [87, 201, 256]. Still others, including Boyer, Moore, Gordon, and Coquand [66, 100, 152], developed automated theorem provers for checking the correctness of verification proofs. Later researchers have built on and improved these efforts, and formal methods remain a vital and fundamental area of basic computing research. Notably, the Cost of Poor Software Quality (CPSQ) is astonishing. In the 2022 Report¹ for the CPQS in the US, the amount is considered at least US\$ 2,41 trillion. Considering the more specific cost of finding and fixing bugs, the estimation is US\$ 607 billion. Therefore, there is scope for applications of formal methods and tools to improve this situation

¹<https://www.it-cisq.org/>

in several domains, much beyond the context of safety-critical systems. Historical references from long-time advocates of formal methods reflect on their industrial application through the metaphors of myths and commandments of formal methods and invite their uptake in industry in order to realize their benefits [29, 61–65, 84, 102, 161, 162, 195, 227, 249, 276, 287, 298]. Throughout the last three decades several major surveys of formal methods have appeared in the literature [90, 135, 138, 144, 299].

This paper demonstrates that formal methods have wide-ranging practical value by reporting on the increasing *use* of formal methods in industry, and it makes a case for the inclusion of formal methods as a separate topic in Computer Science education. This is well-agreed upon by the formal methods community. To make this point better known to the Computer Science community at large and, in particular, to those involved in Computer Science education, the remainder of this article develops as follows. First, in Section 2, we give more detail about what formal methods are, precisely. Then, in Section 3, we survey the vast array of formal-methods applications, much beyond the context of safety-critical systems.² In our brief survey, we cite specific instances across a variety of different domains of successful applications of the techniques in delivering systems that, by their nature, must be reliable. These include very recent work, which was not available five years ago when the most recent above-mentioned surveys were conducted, as well as testimonies contributed by current industry leaders. Next, in Section 4, we argue that undergraduate curricula should include formal methods as a topic, not only because of their growing importance in industry, as witnessed by the evidence presented in this paper, but also because formal methods contribute to cultivate abstract thinking, enabling students to better understand and solve complex problems, and because of the discipline they instil in students as they learn to develop systems. In the words of Rance Cleaveland, “students who learn formal methods are better developers, because they learn to think about correctness while they are building systems.” Further support for such statements can be found in [34] and in the accompanying papers [118], which underlines the importance of formal methods *thinking* in Computer Science education, and [70], which argues that every computer scientist needs to *know* formal methods: “software developers not being aware of the various benefits of formal methods cannot be called computer scientists or software engineers.” Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper.

2 Formal Methods and Tools

Complex, industrial systems typically come into being according to some standardized software development methodology. Most methodologies distinguish different phases in the development of a system. While these phases may differ across development methodologies, and carry different names, in general, there is a requirements analysis phase, an architecture design phase, a system design phase, and an implementation phase. Each phase yields a set of artefacts. Apart from describing the type of artefacts delivered at each phase in the development of a system, a methodology also describes the validation and verification methods and activities needed to ensure the internal consistency of an artefact, and the consistency of artefacts across different phases. For instance, the artefacts produced during the requirements phase need to be non-contradictory, whereas the artefacts produced in the design phase need to be consistent with the artefacts delivered in the requirements phase. Formal methods, and their implementation in widely available tools, provide automated, repeatable, easily checkable evidence to support these needs. Triggered by their successful applications in industry, we mostly focus on a *posteriori* verification of (software) systems.

²We survey formal-methods applications from well-known and representative domains, including papers and testimonies that have been selected based on the expertise and experience of the authors, spread geographically as well as across different application domains.

We do not discuss in detail the verification of formal specifications of requirements nor the alternative of *a priori* verification techniques, such as developing correct-by-construction system implementations based on formal methods that provide correctness-preserving refinement transformations (like in the seminal work on the refinement calculus and related calculi by Back [10], Morris [231], and Morgan [230], based on Dijkstra’s guarded command language [114]).

In the remainder of this section, we first define and introduce formal methods in Section 2.1, after which we provide an overview of selected formal methods and tools in Section 2.2.

2.1 What are Formal Methods?

In line with [138], in this paper we define formal methods as mathematically rigorous techniques for the specification, design, validation, and (manual or automated) verification of software and (logical) hardware systems. In short, formal methods enable checking that behaviours (statements in a formal semantics such as mathematical logic) always hold in a system (specified in a language with a formal semantics). They examine the entire behaviour space of the system, covering all possible inputs, to provide assurance derived from a mathematical proof that the specified system’s behaviour is correct. In other words, formal methods address the verification problem: given formal definitions of what a system does (M) and what it should do (φ), formal methods show that M satisfies φ . Intuitively, formal methods show that the system does what you think it should do *and nothing else*.

That last part, “and nothing else,” distinguishes exhaustive formal methods from non-exhaustive methods for verification, such as testing [14, 50, 58, 226] and simulation [181, 291]. These popular methods reason over the *input space* of a system by producing a set of *individual system executions*. By aggregating a large set of executions, they can provide probabilistic answers to questions such as: how often does some behaviour occur, how many inputs produce a certain type of output, or how likely is something to occur. They can provide a proof of the existence of a run of a system, such as a run that exhibits a fault, but since neither testing nor simulation explores all possible system behaviour (state space), they can never show the absence of such a run. For that, we need (exhaustive) formal methods.

Formal methods reason over the *behaviour space* of a system. They yield Boolean (typically true or false, not probabilistic) answers to questions like: is it possible for something to occur, does this property hold for all system executions, or even how many system execution paths lead to a certain output. While testing and simulation involve executing the system many times to gather examples for verification, formal methods tools generally execute once but reason exhaustively over the complete set of system behaviours, covering all possible executions. This is also why there is such a variety of formal methods (as opposed to a singular formal method) – different methods scale differently and different systems require different proof strategies to enable such exhaustive reasoning. Successful application of formal methods requires some knowledge of the underlying system, and therefore which formal method(s) to apply.

In practice, (exhaustive) formal methods provide quite a different understanding of a system than non-exhaustive or informal methods. Informal or semi-formal methods refer to techniques and tools that are not fully formal, i.e., lacking a precise and unambiguously defined syntax and semantics. Formal methods can prove both the presence and the absence of given behaviour. Because mathematical proofs reason equally well over partially-defined systems as fully-defined ones, formal methods can check systems starting from the earliest stages of the system design. While simulation and testing require some form of executable to run, formal methods do not. Nor are formal methods sensitive to systems being used in ways they were not intended, such as receiving unanticipated inputs. These are precisely the properties that make formal methods essential tools for industry, e.g., for certifying software and hardware systems, also for non-safety-critical

systems. Anticipating the testimonies from Rod Chapman (Amazon Web Services) in Section 3.6 and Ivo ter Horst (ASML) in Section 3.8, respectively:

Chapman: “A key point is that Automated Reasoning (AR) builds trust with customers by allowing universal and sound verification of properties of our infrastructure and customers’ applications. By “universal,” AWS means properties that hold for all users, all storage buckets, all networks, all compute instances, all configurations, and so on — freeing the user from having to “test” a nearly infinite state space.”

ter Horst: “To make ASML’s lithography systems run reliably and consistently ASML needs software that sends unambiguous instructions in every situation to the carefully engineered hardware. One way that ASML ensures this is by formally verifying (model checking) the specified machine behaviour and automatically generating correct and semantically equivalent code from those models.”

For this reason, experts continue to argue for the continuous integration of formal methods throughout the complex industrial system development lifecycle, and for the formal methods education of system developers [138] (cf. Section 3.1). In our experience, reported in this paper, which covers 50 years of work in industry as well as in academia, most software projects lack the discipline seen in other branches of engineering. Few developers approach their work with the understanding that mistakes will be made and that they should select and use the methods and tools that were designed to prevent errors and to detect errors as early as possible after they are made. Too few Computer Science graduates work in a way that shows that they understand their responsibility to be able to provide evidence that their software meets their customer’s or end user’s requirements — and that evidence from testing can never be strong enough on its own.

This does not mean that we are suggesting that formal methods exclude or are a replacement for testing or simulation. As mentioned in the Introduction, these are complementary techniques for the central task of verification and validation (cf. [169] and, for a concrete example, Section 3.9: Formal Testing of Mobile Devices from Natural Language Requirements). Our purpose is to emphasize the distinguishing feature of formal methods in being capable of mathematically ensuring the absence of errors with respect to a given specification.

2.2 Overview of Formal Methods and Tools

Formal methods offer the means to both formally describe the artefacts delivered at each phase in the system development lifecycle, and aid in their automated validation and verification [7, 135]. Some tools prove useful throughout the development methodology; others may specialize to address specific phases and activities. As mentioned in the beginning of this section, we focus on formal methods for the verification phase. We refer to [70] for a discussion on formal methods for all phases: identifying and formalizing requirements, modelling and formal specification, design and implementation, verification and validation, and maintenance and evolution. There are two core formal (verification) methods from which all other formal (verification) methods derive: *model checking* [17, 88] and *theorem proving* [238, 266].

Theorem provers, such as Coq³ [51], Isabelle [241], Lean [233], Vampire [264], KeYmaera X [254, 255], LP [140], PVS [248], Z3 [232], and others allow users to mechanically, and sometimes even automatically, prove generic statements and theories about system artefacts formalized as mathematical theories. Theorem proving has found its way in tool sets for state-based refinement approaches (as originally advocated by VDM [188], Z [282], and subsequently B [2, 3]), such as Atelier B⁴ and

³Coq received the 2013 ACM Software System Award.

⁴<https://www.atelierb.eu/>

Event-B.⁵ A theorem prover’s independence of specific problem domains is one of its major strong points. Each theorem prover brings its own library of previous proofs upon which it can draw to efficiently prove new theorems. Theorem provers differ in the contents of these libraries and in their input logics. Typically users choose which theorem prover to use for a particular job by choosing the input language that most intuitively describes the verification question at hand and checking the proof library for previous proofs useful in constructing the needed proof. While a theorem prover can complete some proofs automatically after the user sets up the theorem correctly, others require substantial interaction from the user to complete the proof, so utilizing previous results from the proof library and having a clearly-defined proof strategy are essential. Theorem provers are very powerful tools that can reason about very large, or even infinite-state, systems and complex mathematical algorithms.

Process-algebraic approaches such as ACP [15], CCS [228], CSP [171, 269], LOTOS [57], or LNT [137] have inspired the development of model-checking toolsets such as CADP⁶ [136], CWB [91] / CWB-NC [93], FDR [143], and mCRL2 [9, 75, 157] (cf. [92]). These and other model checkers, such as SPIN⁷ [172], NuSMV [86] / nuXmv [80], UPPAAL⁸ [38, 39, 109, 110], ProB [211], and ABC [69], provide a convenient “push-button” technique for automatically assessing the consistency of an artefact (e.g., an algorithm or design described in a formal semantics) by automatically verifying whether it satisfies behavioural specifications typically expressed as assertions or using some form of temporal logic. The industrial appeal of model checking includes the limited user interaction required to achieve a complete, exhaustive verification result. To effectively use a model checker, the user needs only two inputs: the formal artefact or system description, and the logical specification to check it against. The user then pushes a button and receives either confirmation, e.g., in the form of a certificate, that the system artefact always upholds the specification, or a counterexample proving that it does not. A counterexample is a system trace stepping state-by-state through a valid execution of the system until a clear violation of the specification occurs. Counterexamples are therefore incredibly useful for debugging. Model checkers produce results that are *exhaustive*: if there exists any system execution that violates the specification, they will produce a counterexample.

In this way, both theorem provers and model checkers effectively prove both the presence and the absence of bugs. Moreover, both theorem provers and model checkers require guidance from a knowledgeable user to structure and organize their specifications, and in the case of theorem provers, also their proofs. Model checkers, on the other hand, have fully-automatic proofs but come with some limitations when compared to theorem provers. Due to their exhaustive exploration of the state space, model checkers are sensitive to the shape and size of the state space of the input system description and often do not allow elements like floating-point variables or unbounded integers. Also, the presence of superfluous information not relevant to the core algorithm under verification can dramatically slow down the model checker or cause it to time-out. Therefore, the user must be careful to describe only the relevant system logic in the input description to mitigate the state-space explosion problem, where the number of states needed to model the system accurately may exceed the amount of available computer memory. “Despite the development of several very effective methods to combat this problem [...], models of realistic systems may still be too large to fit in memory” [17, Section 1.2.2: Strengths and Weaknesses].

Similarly to choosing a theorem prover, users choose model checkers based on the efficiency of the input modelling language at describing the verification problem at hand. There are two types

⁵<http://www.event-b.org/>

⁶CADP received the ETAPS Test-of-Time Tool Award 2023.

⁷SPIN received the 2001 ACM Software System Award.

⁸<https://uppaal.org/>

of model checkers, explicit and symbolic, and some knowledge of which of these two types is best-suited to the problem is also helpful. Explicit model checkers explicitly represent the systems' behaviour space as a type of graph in memory and the model checker systematically explores each state and verifies whether it satisfies the given specification. Such an enumerative representation is suitable for systems with smaller state spaces, or state spaces with certain types of repeated patterns. Instead of representing individual states or transitions, symbolic model checkers represent sets of states and sets of transitions symbolically using data structures such as Boolean formulas or Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs). Symbolic model checking is particularly suitable for systems with a large, or even infinite state space. Finally, for both theorem proving and model checking, the user must be careful to specify the behaviour property correctly. Since many system requirements in natural language are vague, incomplete, or confusing, this can be a very challenging task [271]. NASA's Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET)⁹ [142] for the elicitation, formalization and understanding of requirements may be of help. FRET assigns unambiguous semantics to requirements written in a structured natural language and allows to export the requirements into forms that can be used by a variety of analysis tools, among which Simulink Design Verifier and SMV (cf., e.g., [123], where it is reported that the industrial partner found the FRET tool "very easy to use").

Next to these exhaustive qualitative verification techniques, it is worth mentioning exhaustive quantitative methods such as probabilistic (a.k.a. stochastic) model checking, and non-exhaustive methods such as runtime verification, model-based testing and statistical model checking, and light-weight formal methods such as static analysis.

Static analysis concerns the derivation of properties of interest from source code (or an intermediate representation) without executing the code [265], meaning precision is the price to pay. Well-known static analysis tools include Astrée¹⁰ [112], Coccinelle¹¹ [204], Frama-C¹² [194], and Lint [187] (cf. [116] for key lessons from designing the static analyses tools Infer and Zoncolan and [210] for a comparison of the static analysis tools Better Code Hub, CheckStyle, Coverity Scan, FindBugs, PMD, and SonarQube). Typically, one has to decide between under- and overapproximations (e.g., abstract interpretation [103]), with the possibility of both false positives and false negatives. Underapproximation¹³ is a consequence of an approach representing all possible program behaviours in a way that includes some, but not necessarily all actual behaviour (thus giving rise to false negatives, i.e., the analysis may fail to detect certain properties of the code), whereas an overapproximation represents the set of all possible program behaviour in a way that includes all actual behaviour as well as possibly some that are not possible (thus giving rise to false positives, i.e., the analysis may detect certain problems that do not actually exist in the code). The choice between under- and overapproximation depends on the specific goals of the analysis and the trade-off between precision and completeness, where the challenge is to find a suitable abstraction that is both computationally feasible and provides meaningful insights into the program's behaviour while dealing with false positives and false negatives.

Model-based testing is a formal-methods approach to testing that complements formal verification and model checking and increases the efficiency and effectiveness of software testing [290]. It uses a formal or semi-formal model to represent the desired behaviour of a system under test, which serves as the basis for generating test cases and executing tests. It is typically more efficient

⁹<https://software.nasa.gov/software/ARC-18066-1>

¹⁰<https://www.astree.ens.fr/>

¹¹<https://coccinelle.gitlabpages.inria.fr/website/>

¹²<https://frama-c.com/>

¹³Not to be confused with underapproximate triples in incorrectness logic [245], a logical underapproximate theory for proving the presence of problems.

than traditional testing approaches, since it automates the test case generation process. Moreover, by systematically deriving test cases from the model, often a better coverage of the system's behaviour is achieved. Model-based testing complements other testing methodologies and is part of the broader landscape of model-driven engineering [73].

Runtime verification monitors analyses actual software (and hardware) system behaviour while the system is running [27, 94]. It offers improved practical applicability and scalability compared to exhaustive formal verification, such as model checking and theorem proving, by analyzing only one—or a few—execution traces of the actual system. Runtime monitoring derives from model checking, except that in model checking the running system is the input system description, so instead of an exhaustive analysis of all possible system runs (like model checking), runtime monitoring analyses only the “current” system run against the input logical specification (cf. [272] for a disambiguation from simulation).

Compared to model checking, which focuses on absolute guarantees of correctness, probabilistic or stochastic model checking focus on modelling and analysing systems that exhibit probabilistic or stochastic behaviour [16, 17, 198, 200, 263]. Such aspects are essential in cases of unreliable or unpredictable system behaviour and performance evaluation. Instead of providing a yes/no answer to the question as to whether a system model (M) satisfies a temporal logic property (φ), the answers are of the form “with a likelihood of 99%, M will satisfy φ ,” where φ is expressed in a stochastic or probabilistic temporal logic. Statistical model checking [5, 208] uses a simulation- and sample-based approach to reason about precise properties specified in a stochastic temporal logic, offering a scalability advantage over exhaustive (or probabilistic) model checking due to the fact that there is no need to analyze entire state spaces. Moreover, even though the outputs of sample-based methods are not always correct, statistical inference enables quantifying the confidence in the obtained result,¹⁴ thus compensating for the lack of exact results (100% confidence).

3 Formal Methods in Industry

In this section, we present a broad scope of applications of formal methods in industry, not limited to the safety-critical domain, including testimonies contributed by Rod Chapman from Amazon Web Services, leader in cloud computing (cf. Section 3.6), and Ivo ter Horst from ASML, leader in the semiconductor industry (cf. Section 3.8). The reported applications of formal methods in industry range from experiments with formal methods in industry to routine applications of formal methods in industry as part of the development process. After a summary of recent literature on successful applications of formal methods in Section 3.1, we describe a selection of success stories for applying formal methods in the safety-critical domains of railways, automotive, and aerospace in Sections 3.2–3.4. Subsequently, we report testimonies of success stories in the non-safety-critical domains of operating systems in Section 3.5, e-commerce in Section 3.6, hardware design in Section 3.7, lithography manufacturing in Section 3.8, and mobile devices in Section 3.9.

3.1 Summary of Recent Literature

Success stories of the application of formal methods in industry traditionally focus on their application to safety-critical systems, such as transport, nuclear power plants, and medical devices. Arguably one of the most cited ones concerns the fatal accidents with the infamous Therac-25 software-controlled radiation therapy machine that were, among others, due to software coding

¹⁴The level of confidence is usually stated as a percentage $100 \times (1 - \alpha)\%$, meaning that $100 \times (1 - \alpha)\%$ of the time the actual expected value belongs to the confidence interval $[X - \delta/2, X + \delta/2]$, where X is the estimated value, α is the confidence, and δ is the width of the confidence interval, which is typically determined based on α and a large enough n , the number of samples obtained from n independent simulations.

errors. As demonstrated in [213, 214, 288, 289] (using, among others, the process algebra LOTOS [57] and the theorem prover LP [140]) these software errors could have been avoided if “basic software engineering principles” and “sophisticated modeling and analysis tools” had been applied. Alas, what Nancy Leveson wrote in 1993, “software should be subjected to extensive testing and formal analysis” [214], and in 2017, “it’s time for computer science practitioners to be better educated about engineering for safety.” [213], is still true. Transport applications include, but are not limited to, the railway [33, 77, 207] and aerospace [234, 281] domains. We refer to, e.g., [32, 36, 128, 145, 174, 299] for more complete overviews of such applications. A recent survey among 216 participants studying the use of formal methods for mission-critical software indicates “an increased intent to apply FMs in industry, suggesting a positively perceived usefulness” [144].

Outside safety-critical applications, the literature also reports a recent uptake in the application of formal methods [82]. Formal methods have, for example, been applied to ensure the quality of cloud services at Amazon [12, 239], cloud databases at Huawei [134], and mobile apps at Facebook [116]. Sadowski et al. [277] describe how formal methods are integrated in the software development workflow at Google. Godefroid reviews concolic testing and various forms of fuzzing, which are capable of scaling to Microsoft applications (e.g., Excel or PowerPoint) with millions of lines of code [146]. Concrete symbolic (concolic) testing is a hybrid software verification technique that performs symbolic execution along concrete execution paths in an attempt to systematically explore the execution of a program, focusing on both specific input values (as for traditional testing) and symbolic representations of various alternative program paths, to achieve improved path coverage compared to traditional testing. Scalability is a challenge due to the path explosion problem, i.e., the number of possible paths grows significantly as the program’s complexity increases [280]. Fuzzing is a more light-weight testing technique focused on quickly exploring a large input space by providing random or semi-random inputs, typically generated by mutation-based or generation-based fuzzing, to a program to discover vulnerabilities or unexpected behaviour [286]. Formal methods have also been used successfully to show the incorrectness of widely used software such as Timsort [154], the Java LinkedList implementation [168], and implementations of the MCS mutual exclusion locks [225] in open-source weak memory models and at Huawei [244], as well as the correctness of the seL4 operating-system kernel [192, 193] and the CompCert C compiler [26, 55, 183].¹⁵ In the same realm, modern programming language features such as Rust’s memory safety and Go’s concurrency have a solid foundation in formal methods (cf., e.g., [104, 189]). Finally, formal methods have also been applied in other domains, like in medical imaging for model checking the segmentation of glioblastoma and nevi [22, 41, 42].

A recent survey among 130 experts in formal methods (including three Turing Award winners,¹⁶ all four FME Fellowship Award winners¹⁷ and 16 CAV Award winners¹⁸) investigated the factors that limit the uptake of formal methods in industry practice. In this survey, 71.5% of the respondents identify that “engineers lack proper training in formal methods” as a *limiting factor for a wider adoption of formal methods by industry* [138, Section 5: Formal Methods in Industry]. Other key limiting factors are that “academic tools have limitations and are not professionally maintained” (66.9%), formal methods “are not properly integrated in the industrial design life cycle” (66.9%) and “have a steep learning curve” (63.8%). Related to this, 62.3% indicates that “developers

¹⁵The seL4 developers received the 2022 ACM Software System Award for “the first industrial-strength, high-performance operating system to have been the subject of a complete, mechanically-checked proof of full functional correctness;” the 2021 ACM Software System Award went to “CompCert, the first practically useful optimizing compiler targeting multiple commercial architectures that has a complete, mechanically checked proof of its correctness.”

¹⁶<https://amturing.acm.org/byyear.cfm>

¹⁷<https://www.fmeurope.org/awards/>

¹⁸<http://i-cav.org/cav-award/>

are reluctant to change their way of working.” Another survey [138] concludes that “the current situation [of formal methods education] is very heterogeneous across universities, and many experts call for a standardisation of university curricula with respect to formal methods.”

In the following sections, we describe a selection of success stories of applying formal methods in both safety-critical (cf. Sections 3.2–3.4) and non-safety-critical domains (cf. Sections 3.5–3.9). Moreover, we relate the formal methods and tools mentioned in Sections 3.2–3.9 to the comprehensive classifications and explanations in Section 2. We acknowledge the need for performing more empirical studies on formal methods according to well-established guidelines [35] to establish at what point formal methods are being applied, which are the most frequently applied techniques and tools, and related questions. From two recent surveys from the literature involving, respectively, 216 professionals from Europe and North America using formal methods in dependable systems engineering [144] and 328 papers on formal methods in railways [128], we know that (i) the professionals employ formal methods mainly for assurance (e.g., proof, error removal), specification (i.e., formal description techniques), and inspection (e.g., error detection, bug finding), while in most of the papers formal methods are applied in the Architecture (66%) and Detailed Design (45%) development phases; (ii) the professionals mainly use formal methods analysis techniques for assertion checking, followed by consistency checking and model checking, while in the papers formal verification is the dominant analysis technique (67%), in particular model checking (47%) and theorem proving (19.5%), whereas static analysis is hardly used (1%); (iii) the professionals were not asked for their experiences with formal methods tools as it was left for future work “to find out which particular FM (and tool) is used in which domain for which particular purpose and role,” while in the papers the tool landscape is rather scattered with ProB (9%), NuSMV (8%), and UPPAAL (7%) among the most frequently used ones, but not much more than Atelier B (5%), Event-B/Rodin (4%), SPIN (4%), and Simulink (4%).

3.2 Formal Methods for Railways

Railway signalling used to be done manually by observing trains and operating signals, which is error-prone and restricts the capacity of railway transportation. Automatic signalling is obviously needed for modern railway control systems. However, the safety of such automatic systems is crucial as a small error in signalling may have catastrophic consequences, such as train collisions. Moreover, replacing manual railway signalling with an automatic solution means huge investments and the extremely high standards of safety make it even more expensive. Formal methods can be a solution both for ensuring the safety of such systems and saving costs [40, Section 3: Cost-Benefit Analysis]. CENELEC EN 50128 is a European standard for the development of software for use in the railway industry [122]. It highly recommends formal methods for the design and verification of products that need to meet the highest safety integrity levels (SIL 3 or SIL 4, i.e., with a maximum accepted probability of dangerous failure between 10^{-7} and 10^{-9} per hour). The above mentioned cost-benefit analysis reported, which follows EU guidelines and covers both financial and economic analysis, is the only such analysis applied to formal methods that we are aware of. We agree with the authors of [40] who call for “greater attention of the formal methods community to the quantification of costs and benefits parameters [...] since the evidence of the beneficial effects of formal methods is mostly given instead in the literature in a qualitative way.” In [247], the authors evaluated (without any monetary measurements) the effect of applying the commercial formal technique Analytical Software Design (ASD) to an industrial project, and they compared the positive results concerning code quality (good) and productivity (high) with those of 13 similar projects that used other formal methods (e.g., B and VDM). The above mentioned recent survey among 130 experts in formal methods also contained a question that asked the experts to make an informal cost-benefit analysis over time [138, Section 5.3: Return on

Investment]. A small majority of 58.5% of the respondents answered that the application of formal methods is *profitable in medium and long terms*; 15% answered that they are *immediately profitable* and 12.3% that they are *profitable in the long term only*, while 2.3% answered that there is *no return on investment* and 11.5% had *no opinion*.

From the above mentioned recent survey of the landscape of research on applications of formal methods to the development of railway systems [128], involving 328 high-quality papers from 1989–2020,¹⁹ we know that formal methods in railways is a thriving research field with strong industrial ties, since 143 papers were published solely in the last five years (44% of the total of 328 papers) and 79 papers (24%) involved industry. Well-known success stories throughout the years concern the development and verification of the Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system for the RER Line A of Paris [159], the Subway Speed Control System (SSCS) of the subway of Calcutta [108], Line 14 of the Paris Metro [117], and derivatives thereof, like line 1 or the NY Canarsie line [121], and the driverless Paris–Roissy Airport shuttle [37], all developed with the B method. B was also used for an industrial scale system-level analysis of Alstom’s U400 system [95], which is in operation in about 100 metro lines worldwide. Another success story concerns the metro control system of Rio de Janeiro, developed with the support of Simulink/Stateflow [125]. Simulink²⁰ is a model-based development tool for graphical system design, supporting simulation, test generation and code generation. A Simulink model’s basic unit is a block diagram such that each block represents a different system component and their connections represent interactions between these components. Simulink comes with Stateflow, a graphical language inspired by Harel’s hierarchical statecharts [166], for modelling and simulating the behaviour of complex systems in the form of state machines and flow charts, and it supports model checking through Simulink Design Verifier, which is part of the Simulink Verification and Validation tools. Further success stories concern the verification of the ERTMS/ETCS European standard for railway control and management with NuSMV [85] and of Hybrid ERTMS/ETCS Level 3 with a variety of formal methods and tools [30, 76]. In particular, in [164], the new system was modelled in B, identifying over 30 issues and using the formal model as a runtime artefact for a real-life demonstration. Moreover, in [6], the system structure of the movement authority scenario of the Chinese Train Control System Level 3 (CTCS-3) was modelled by core constructs of the Architectural Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [111, 278], with its extensions Behavior Language for Embedded Systems with Software (BLESS) [203] for the discrete behaviour and Hybrid CSP [184] for the continuous behaviour, and verified with the Hybrid Hoare Logic (HHL) Prover [295], an interactive theorem prover based on Isabelle/HOL. Recently, the Autonomous Positioning System (APS) of the Florence tramways was verified with the support of the model checker UPPAAL [28]. See [126, 127, 223] for comparisons of different formal methods and tools for railway system design.

Railway transportation, such as trains, metros, and trams, is one of the most environmentally friendly and energy-efficient means of transportation. In the domain of railway control systems, a large number of research projects that involve formal methods have been carried out during the past decades, such as RobustRail²¹ and more than one hundred projects funded under the

¹⁹The survey was conducted following the guidelines for systematic mapping studies [252]. In particular, the 328 high-quality papers were selected from an initial set of 4346 papers retrieved from scientific databases upon the application of predefined criteria for inclusion (e.g., the study is written in English language) and exclusion (e.g., the study does not use a formal or semi-formal method) plus a quality checklist (e.g., is there a clear description of the task addressed with formal methods?) used for grading the papers. All papers with an insufficient overall quality score were excluded from the selection.

²⁰<https://nl.mathworks.com/products/simulink.html>

²¹<http://www.robustrails.man.dtu.dk>

Shift2Rail initiative,²² including the X2Rail series. Shift2Rail and its successor Europe’s Rail are joint efforts of railway stakeholders and the EU to advance the railway domain through innovative research projects involving both academia and industry, in which formal methods are considered to be fundamental to the provision of safe and reliable technological advances in railways [33]. Notable initiatives outside the EU are the UK Rail Research and Innovation Network (UKRRIN)²³ and the Chinese State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety.²⁴

Companies such as Alstom and Siemens are using formal methods, such as the B language, in the development of their train control systems as well as for data validation [206, 212], notably using the model checker ProB within tools like Systerel’s OVADO²⁵ [1, 13] and the ClearSy Data Solver,²⁶ both of which are certified T2 (i.e., tools where a fault could lead to an error in the results of verification or validation) for SIL 4 in accordance to the CENELEC EN 50128 standard. Prover is another industrial leader in formal methods for railway signalling automation. They develop software tools and services to support railway signalling design automation. Their solution covers a formal high-level language for formal verification and tools for developing, testing, and verifying railway control systems, like railway interlocking systems. They apply formal verification techniques, like theorem proving, in their interlocking software, digital twins, and development tools for railway signalling, which have been used in projects worldwide, like Sweden, Norway, China, France, and Canada.²⁷ The Prover Certifier formal verification tool, which includes the Prover PSL model checker, is also certified T2 for SIL 4 in accordance to the CENELEC EN 50128 standard. Moreover, the successful application of formal methods in Prover shows that formal verification can cut on-site testing time by up-to 50% and detect bugs that are overlooked by traditional testing:²⁸ “Formal Verification provides **much** higher coverage than testing. At Prover, we always find errors when doing formal verification, even on systems that have gone through regular verification”²⁹

In the near future, the Railway domain is expected to contribute significantly to the European Green Deal by improved digitalization and data analytics.³⁰ Challenges include the extension of formal methods and tools to cope with AI-based systems, such as equipping verification tools with certificate generation, and their integration in the CENELEC standards [279].

3.3 Formal Methods for Automotive

ISO 26262 is an international standard for functional safety in the automotive industry [179]. It provides guidelines and requirements for the development of safety-critical electrical and electronic systems (E/E systems) in vehicles. The standard is focused on ensuring the safety of E/E systems that are involved in the operation of passenger cars, motorcycles, trucks, and buses. The standard defines a safety life-cycle that encompasses various phases, including requirements, system, hardware, and software development. It emphasizes the identification and assessment of potential hazards, as well as the implementation of safety measures to mitigate risks. ISO 26262 also outlines processes for safety management, hazard analysis, risk assessment, and *verification and*

²²<https://projects.shift2rail.org>

²³<https://www.ukrrin.org.uk/>

²⁴<http://en.bjtu.edu.cn/research/institute/laboratory/16583.htm>

²⁵<https://www.ovado.net/>

²⁶<https://www.clearsy.com/en/tools/data-solver/>

²⁷<https://www.prover.com>

²⁸<https://www.prover.com/categories/verification-validation>

²⁹Daniel Fredholm from Prover Technology in his presentation *Formal Verification in the Railway Domain* during FME’s “InFM: Industry talks on Formal Methods” series on May 16, 2024.

³⁰<https://transport.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/2021-mobility-strategy-and-action-plan.pdf>

validation of functional safety, defined as the absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E systems.³¹

Compliance with ISO 26262 is typically required by regulatory bodies and is expected by customers in the automotive industry. Adhering to the standard helps ensure that vehicles and their associated systems are designed, developed, and produced with a focus on safety, reducing the likelihood of failures or malfunctions that could lead to accidents or injuries. Formal methods are considered the best choice in order to handle complexity and improve confidence in the automotive system's correctness, and although not mandated by ISO 26262, they are clearly encouraged and actually used, as demonstrated in the next paragraphs.

The need for advanced formal methodologies for design, development, and verification of automotive systems was identified by both industry and academia. Several projects were launched, and many problems were addressed. The Systems Modelling Language (SysML) [180] is a general-purpose modelling language for systems engineering applications defined as an extension to UML addressing the structuring of requirements and their verification. Within several EU research projects, the Architecture Description Language, a metamodel and an ontology for representing engineering information for automotive embedded systems, called EAST-ADL³² [56], was developed. EAST-ADL went further and applied an automotive ontology and representation aligned with AUTOSAR for the structuring of engineering information. The EAST-ADL model is structured in abstraction levels, where each sub-model represents the complete embedded system, at the relevant level of detail. The EAST-ADL abstraction levels map to the abstraction levels given in ISO 26262. EU projects like ATEST, CESAR, SafeCer, MAENAD, and MBAT all addressed the use of models and tools to automate the representation and formal verification of automotive systems' requirements.

Volvo Group Trucks Technology (VGTT) in Sweden is a division of Volvo Trucks that is a world-leading truck manufacturer, providing total transport solutions. In its *Model-based Continuous Integration of Automotive Embedded Systems* [215], VGTT applies the following engineering principles in order to address their product development and process challenges: (i) *Go Virtual*, to allow daily deliveries and maximize verification confidence while exercising dangerous and rare events, (ii) *Go Rigorous*, which requires the use of models, data, and formal verification to provide means to secure products versus needs and requirements, and allow engineering rigour and automation, (iii) *Go Multi-Method*, which incorporates in the engineering workflow a multitude of tools for the model representation (EAST-ADL, Simulink, the object-oriented, declarative modelling language Modelica,³³ its Association Project Function Mockup Interface,³⁴ and the model checker UPPAAL), as well as software-centric and physics-centric simulation (e.g., EAST-ADL/Simulink and Function Mockup Units) and formal verification of components' behaviour and timing (e.g., by employing the model-checking toolset UPPAAL), (iv) *Go Consistent*, to ensure that binaries and components are faithful realizations of models and code, and (v) *Go Continuous* to deliver daily/weekly/monthly component versions and tests. All these methods and tools for modelling and verification have been integrated or are under integration in VGTT's *ADAPT Integration Environment*, leading to *development efficiency* via iterative and incremental development, and *assured product quality* by incorporating *formal techniques*, such as SAT-based requirements consistency-checking with the Z3 theorem prover [216, 217] and model checking with the UPPAAL model checker [131, 158, 218], in the engineering workflow.

³¹<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/en/#iso:std:iso:26262:-1:ed-2:v1:en>

³²<https://www.east-adl.info/>

³³<https://modelica.org/>

³⁴<https://fmi-standard.org/>

The recent rise of autonomous vehicles has brought exciting new challenges to the automotive industry to make such vehicles safe, reliable, and trustworthy, respect legal regulations, and ready for societal acceptance. These include dealing with uncertainties and incomplete or inaccurate information, as well as the development of effective formal methods and tools for the verification of AI-based systems based on transparent and explainable components that can be certified [219].

3.4 Formal Methods for Aerospace

Formal methods are now an expected and required part of the development processes of intelligent, autonomous, and safety-critical air and space systems. Their use is codified into flight certification, e.g., by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) via DO-178B [257], DO-178C [260], DO-333 [259], and DO-254 [258], and in the EU by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.³⁵ International standards agencies IEEE and IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) maintain tens of standards for avionics involving formal methods [177, 178]. See [132] for a more detailed discussion of regulations for formal methods in certification of reliable autonomous systems, which include Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), covering airborne vehicles ranging from toy quadcopters to military UAS and autonomous missiles, but also driverless trains and self-driving cars.

Systems whose requirements, design, verification, and maintenance were shaped by formal methods continue to further the frontiers of modern aerospace engineering. For example, explicit-state model checking with model checkers like SPIN and the software model checker Java PathFinder [292] increased the robustness of the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) [236]; proved the absence of synchronization faults in the Tactical Separation Assurance Flight Environment (TSAFE) [52]; verified a design-time hierarchical, concurrent spacecraft model [224]; and analyzed the Mars Science Laboratory's flight software [156, 173]. Symbolic model checking of temporal logic formulas [270] with model checkers like (Nu)SMV / nuXmv verified the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) flying on-board commercial aircraft [83]; ensured internal aircraft modes followed the A-7E aircraft software requirements [283]; provided the basis for the Correctness, Modelling and Performability of Aerospace Systems (COMPASS) [67]; robustified Boeing's AIR6110 wheel braking system [68]; and changed NASA's design for the NextGen automated air traffic control system [139, 222, 302]. Such successes convinced the engineers at Dassault Aviation of the feasibility of verifying Esterel programs [49], which they use for parts of the safety-critical software of flight control systems but also for mission management systems. Theorem proving with theorem provers like KeYmaera and PVS provided many core verification results, e.g., for full-scale, real-life air traffic control systems including KB3D pair-wise conflict detection and resolution algorithms [235], Stratway (a modular approach to strategic conflict resolution) [160], ACCoRD (state-based conflict detection and resolution algorithms) [237], Chorus (tactical conflict and loss of separation detection and resolution) [78], and ACAS-X (Airborne Collision Avoidance System X) [182]. The theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [300] provided proofs for partition scheduling of a commercial real-time operating system implemented following the ARINC 653 international aerospace industry standard [4].

Next to these exhaustive qualitative verification techniques, the exhaustive quantitative method of probabilistic model checking, in particular the probabilistic model checker PRISM³⁶ [199],

³⁵Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32018R1139>.

³⁶PRISM received the ETAPS Test-of-Time Tool Award 2024.

proved instrumental in increasing the robustness of ACAS-X [294]; carrying out comparative analysis of automated air traffic control systems [303]; assessing the reliability, availability, and maintainability of a satellite [250]; and analyzing NASA's SPIDER distributed, fault-tolerant operating system [120]. We conclude with non-exhaustive formal methods. Static analysis made possible the verification of a large, complex software system that provides separation assurance between multiple airplanes up to 20 minutes ahead of time [141]. Dynamic analysis, a scalable alternative to static analysis for models with nonlinear dynamics, enabled rigorous safety-checking of the nonlinear predicates that arise from dynamics-based predictions used in alerting logic for a state-of-the-art parallel aircraft landing protocol [119]. Three runtime verification engines have been designed specifically for aerospace use-cases: NASA Langley's Copilot [251, 253], DLR's RTLola [31], and R2U2 [185, 273].

Advances in the scalability, adaptability, and connectivity of all of these tools and techniques have created an ecosystem advancing the system lifecycle of robust aerospace systems through their combined use. For example, NASA's Lunar Gateway is currently being designed from formal requirements authored as assume-guarantee contracts, verified at design time and carried through the system lifecycle all the way to on-board, real-time runtime verification [106, 107, 186].

3.5 Formal Methods for Operating Systems

From the beginning, formal methods have been inspired by the problems arising from multi-user operating systems, especially parallel programming and communication protocols, for which specification languages and automated protocol validation techniques based on state-space exploration have been developed since the 1970s, e.g., [274, 296]. The application field of formal methods further expanded to also encompass the verification of distributed algorithms, such as the atomic multicast protocol used for the DELTA-4 distributed dependable architecture [23].

There have been many success stories of formal methods in this area. One can mention the formal verification of the seL4 general-purpose commercial microkernel using the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover [192, 193], the SLAM verification platform based on static analysis and symbolic model checking for analyzing the source code of Microsoft Windows drivers [18–21], Microsoft's SAGE whitebox fuzzer, which found roughly one third of all the bugs discovered by file fuzzing during the development of Windows 7 [147–150], and the Coccinelle static analysis tool for automatically updating the Linux kernel and drivers [204, 205, 267].

3.6 Formal Methods for Cloud Security and e-Commerce

Amazon Web Services (AWS) has developed and deployed formal and automated reasoning technology for more than a decade. AWS leadership have recently described a "Golden Age" [275] for automated reasoning (AR), with AR Group founder Byron Cook noting:

"Formal methods is transforming how Amazon Web Services (AWS) secures the cloud. Security has historically been a manual, high-judgement and thus un-scalable field; automated formal reasoning is challenging that entire structure, changing both the quality of AWS products and the cost structure to support them. The key at AWS has been to avoid "shiny-object syndrome" [99] and instead build and apply tools that quietly but reliably change the behaviour of engineers. Many leaders at AWS were skeptical of this type of work in 2016, but the success in areas such as cryptography, identity, storage and virtualization has changed minds."

A key point is that AR builds trust with customers by allowing universal and sound verification of properties of AWS' infrastructure and customers' applications. By "universal," AWS means

properties that hold for all users, all storage buckets, all networks, all compute instances, all configurations, and so on — freeing the user from having to “test” a nearly infinite state space.

The deployment of AR within AWS covers a broad spectrum — from deep proofs of foundational code, through properties of protocols and internal services, to universal properties of customer-facing applications at enormous scale. A small selection of examples includes:

- (1) At the foundational level, AWS has proven the memory- and type-safety of the first-stage boot code of its servers [98], giving them confidence that the code is crash-proof and resistant to code injection attacks for all possible configurations. The authors used the C Bounded Model Checker (CBMC) [89], but mention that “any other bit-precise, sound, automated static analysis tool could be used.” More recently, AWS has produced a library, called “s2n-bignum,” that provides primitive operations for elliptic curve field elements and points [163]. These operations underpin billions of cryptographic operations per day. s2n-bignum is the first cryptographic library that combines formal proofs of functional correctness for multiple variants of the ARM64 and x86_64 micro-architectures, resistance to timing-based side-channel attacks, and performance that is equal to or exceeds all other contemporary implementations. The s2n-bignum code [167] and proofs are freely available under a permissive licence.
- (2) The AWS authorization system evaluates each request to AWS against relevant access control policies to determine if access is allowed or denied. An internal service called *Zelkova* [11] takes in a set of policies and uses automated reasoning to analyze every possible request that would be allowed by those policies. Under the hood, *Zelkova* translates each policy into a set of SMT constraints that are passed to a “portfolio” of solvers, such as the theorem provers Z3, CVC4 [25] and CVC5 [24] for solving Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) in a “winner-takes-all” race. In 2019, AWS extended *Zelkova* to introduce “IAM Access Analyzer,” which removes the burden of requiring the user to write formal access control specifications. Instead, the tool presents the user with a set of “findings” that the user can review and mark as “intended” or “not intended.” This interaction is actually a form of formal specification refinement, although the user does not have to interact with the underlying formal model. By late 2022, *Zelkova* and its customer-facing services were generating over 1 Billion SMT queries per day [275].³⁷
- (3) In late 2020, AWS announced the availability of strong read-after-write consistency in the S3 storage service. S3 operates at a currently preposterous scale, storing over 100 Trillion objects and handling over 10 Million requests per second [293]. Strong consistency ensures that the same view of an object is available to all readers instantly following a write operation to that object. Consistency properties were specified and verified using *Dafny* [209], a verification-aware programming language which uses the Z3 automated theorem prover for discharging proof obligations. To deal with continued evolution of the system, formal verification activities are built into the development team’s continuous integration pipeline and run before traditional testing [97].

3.7 Formal Methods for Hardware Design

In the design of modern circuits (e.g., processors, co-processors, systems on chip), the largest part of the effort is dedicated to testing (which is usually called “verification” in this hardware domain) and “formal verification” (which implies the use of formal methods). A fair estimation is that more than 50% of the effort is dedicated to verification (formal or not) [72, 262], which is much higher than what is typically observed in the software industry.

³⁷<https://www.amazon.science/blog/a-billion-smt-queries-a-day>

The main difference between hardware and software is the impossibility to apply late patches to circuits, as usually done to fix bugs and design mistakes in software systems (such as the famous “patch Tuesday” [74]). Some degree of patching is possible for processors, e.g., by releasing updates for the firmware, or by embedding slow yet reliable fall-back algorithms, to be used as replacements for modern, highly optimized algorithms if these happen to be wrong or cause run-time errors. Yet, in most cases, patching circuits after they are shipped is nearly impossible (if these circuits are embedded in larger systems) and very expensive. For instance, the design error in the Intel Sandy Bridge chipset cost an estimated US\$ 700 million [176].

Formal verification led to many success stories in the hardware-design industry, e.g., for checking the correctness of implementations of instruction sets, for checking the many communication protocols and distributed algorithms (as modern circuits heavily rely on concurrency), for checking that code generation produces correct results (this is known as “equivalence checking”), for checking that asynchronous logic performs well, and so on.

Theorem proving is instrumental in the design of correct circuits. For instance, the ACL2 theorem prover³⁸ [190, 191] has been used by companies such as AMD, Arm, Centaur Technology, IBM, Intel, Oracle, and Collins Aerospace. For example, it gave a formal proof that the security policy of the Rockwell Collins AAMP7 microprocessor enforces a static separation kernel and is thus able to concurrently process information ranging from unclassified to top secret [155, 165].

Model checking also plays an important role in hardware verification. For instance, the Mur ϕ model checker [115, 285] and its many derivatives have been helpful for checking cache-coherence and security protocols. Also, the CADP model-checking toolbox [136] has been used by hardware companies such as Bull, CEA/Leti, STMicroelectronics, and Tiempo in numerous case studies (cf., e.g., [60, 101, 196, 202, 221, 301]).

CAD tool vendors (e.g., Cadence and Synopsys) provide tools that, to a certain extent, embody formal methods under the hood. High-level languages such as VHDL or SystemVerilog are used to describe the components, while languages based on temporal logic, such as SVA or PSL, are used to describe the expected properties. Further dissemination of formal methods in the hardware industry is currently limited by the insufficient number of experts, an issue that is addressed in various ways: in-house training by experienced engineers, tutorials given by CAD tool vendors, and—more recently—specific training delivered by small, dedicated service companies.³⁹ In [81], the specific shortage of verification engineers in the hardware design domain of microelectronics is addressed, emphasizing the importance of teaching the “verification mindset,” accelerating the learning curve for verification techniques, and incorporating new paradigms like AI into the verification process.

3.8 Formal Methods for Lithography Manufacturing

ASML⁴⁰ is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of chip-making equipment, such as lithography machines which drive Moore’s Law [229] forward. Lithography machines are complex cyber-physical systems which use light to print tiny patterns on silicon; a fundamental step in mass producing microchips.

ASML’s lithography machines aim to print microchip patterns as accurately and consistently as possible, even in high-volume manufacturing environments. Reliable chip manufacturing requires extremely tailored processes for each customer, so any unexpected change — even an improvement — comes at a cost. To make ASML’s lithography systems run reliably and consistently ASML needs software that sends unambiguous instructions in every situation to the carefully engineered

³⁸The Boyer–Moore theorem prover, a precursor to ACL2, received the 2005 ACM Software System Award.

³⁹Cf., e.g., <https://aedvices.com>

⁴⁰<https://asml.com>

hardware. One way that ASML ensures this is by formally verifying (model checking) the specified machine behaviour and automatically generating correct and semantically equivalent code from those models [54].

To this aim, ASML uses the Coco platform,⁴¹ which integrates the imperative programming language Coco, designed for (a)synchronous event-driven software systems based on state machines, with the model checker Cosmos, designed to formally verify Coco programs (e.g., absence of deadlocks, livelocks, and race conditions, responsiveness, etc.), and is capable of generating executable code. Cosmos uses a customized process model with respect to the FDR refinement model checker for CSP that can be resolved without state-space explosion.

ASML applies this development methodology to systems ranging from high-level supervisory machine control components to low-level drivers, by expressing behaviour in many asynchronously communicating (via formally defined interfaces) state machines. Some of these state machines have billions of states (reflecting the complexity of the machine's behaviour), but even in much smaller ones there are inherent risks of issues like deadlocks and race conditions. ASML's experience is that humans have difficulty overseeing all parallel behaviour of even the smaller state machines. This is a potential risk to consistent machine operation and might even result in downtime. Formal verification helps ASML engineers to uncover many of these notoriously hard-to-find issues in an early development phase and has therefore become a critical and cost-effective design aid for ASML.

Formally verifying all desired (e.g., end-to-end) properties is currently infeasible due to various reasons, including the size and complexity of ASML's systems. Therefore, ASML incorporates runtime verification techniques in the testing process, which focus on aspects not already covered by formal verification.

The more code that is generated from formally verified models, the less chance of customers encountering bugs in ASML's software. Although that rarely happens, ASML wants it to never happen. By formally verifying more behaviour and more properties, ASML can get even closer to that goal.

3.9 Formal Testing of Mobile Devices from Natural Language Requirements and Other Stories from Brazil

Motorola Mobility, a Lenovo Company, has a partnership of over two decades with the Federal University of Pernambuco, in Brazil, to conceive a sound, automated, and industrial-scale testing strategy that can be applied in the mobile device domain. In the period from November 2022 to November 2023, Motorola was ranked second in the mobile vendor market share in Brazil⁴² and eighth worldwide.⁴³ This is clearly not a safety-critical domain but rather a mission-critical domain, in the sense that escaped defects can severely affect the reputation of the company and cause significant financial losses. The overall strategy was implemented in a tool named TaRGeT [129]. It has been used by some Motorola teams that reported gains between 40% and 50% in productivity related to the overall testing process [130, 242]. Prior to this cooperation, testing was mainly a manual task in Motorola. Currently, Motorola instead adopts a formal, model-based, testing approach based on *hidden formal methods*.

The input to the developed testing strategy [243] is a text document written in a Controlled Natural Language (CNL), suitable for writing requirements, use cases and test cases, but with formal syntax and semantics. Benefitting from natural language processing techniques, a formal

⁴¹<https://cocotec.io/>

⁴²<https://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/brazil>

⁴³<https://gs.statcounter.com/vendor-market-share/mobile/worldwide>

model (in CSP [171, 269]) is automatically derived from these requirements. Using the CSP model checker FDR [143], test cases are automatically generated as CSP traces and then translated back into CNL (for manual execution) or into scripts for several automation frameworks, for automated execution. The defined formal conformance relation is *cspio*, a CSP-based conformance relation distinguishing input and output based on the input/output conformance (*ioco*) implementation relation for input/output labelled transition systems (IOLTS) [53], formalized in the traces model of CSP. The reason for adopting an *ioco*-based relation is that *ioco* captures both partial specifications (important in the context of testing mobile devices, as the testing is on a feature-by-feature basis) and allows reduction of nondeterminism, also useful for allowing implementation choices. Many variants of *ioco* have been proposed in the literature (e.g., *uioco*, *mioco*, *wioco*, and *sioco*) to deal with under-specification, time, data, and so on. However, while model-based (conformance) testing has been studied intensively, today only a few tools based on variants of the *ioco* conformance relation are still maintained actively, such as TESTOR, implemented on top of CADP [220].

Typically, the underlying formal models of test case generation approaches are IOLTS or other operational models. The main reason to use CSP as a semantic foundation for the project was that CSP, being a process algebra, offers a variety of process operators, semantic models, and process refinement notions. This provides a rich infrastructure to support the characterization of test generation at a very high level of abstraction, and, particularly, agnostic to algorithms that rely on the model structure. Test generation is accomplished using refinement assertions in the CSP traces model. The initial generation strategy considered only control flow behaviour, but, subsequently, it was straightforward to evolve it, in a conservative way, to incorporate data and time as orthogonal aspects. Concerning the time to generate the test cases, a tool like TaRGeT is incomparably faster than designing test cases manually. Nevertheless, there are other activities in the process, beyond test design, that need to be performed both in case the tests are designed manually and when they are generated automatically. Particularly, the inspection phase takes a significant amount of time.

Currently, more elaborate frameworks are being developed with the aim of covering the full life cycle of test generation and execution. An exciting area for future investigation is the use of robotic arms to automate test execution that needs human interaction, based on AI, as well as voice, image, and natural language processing techniques.

Concerning other initiatives on the application of formal methods in Brazil, we single out a cooperation with Embraer, a Brazilian commercial aircraft company that is currently one of the largest in the world. This partnership has involved both formal verification using Simulink and the probabilistic model checker PRISM [151] and rigorous approaches to software testing [79], using so-called expanded data-flow reactive systems encoded as TIOTS, an alternative timed model based on IOLTS and *ioco*. Another successful cooperation was the one with Bang & Olufsen (B & O) in the context of the EU project COMPASS. The particular application was a verified design of a leadership election protocol that ensures the absence of deadlock in the (possibly dynamic) configuration of a network of B & O audio and video equipments [8], using CSP and the model checker FDR.

4 Educating for Formal Methods in Industry

It is our firm belief that formal methods, from formal specification to refinement and verification, constitute a core knowledge area in Computer Science with widespread relevance in many of today's innovative applications, like reliable autonomous vehicles and (robotic) systems, in a society that increasingly relies on software. Yet in most of today's Computer Science curricula, discrete mathematics and logic courses are often perceived by Computer Science students as early challenges in their education, apparently disconnected from modern programming languages. "A

knowledge area directly focused on formal methods can help contextualize discrete mathematics courses for students, and can demonstrate why such courses are taught so early as a starting foundation for a solid computer science education” [70].

Formal methods do not appear in CS2023, the ACM/IEEE-CS/AAAI Computer Science Curricula⁴⁴ [197], to the extent that reflects their pivotal role in Computer Science and the benefits that formal methods education can bring to industry. CS2023 encompasses 17 knowledge areas.⁴⁵ In [34, 70, 118], it is argued that eight of them are related to formal methods. Here we list these areas and provide suggestions for what to teach in relation with formal methods:

Algorithmic Foundations Teach to reason (at least informally) about the correctness of the classical algorithms (e.g., a bug was found in the TimSort sorting algorithm of the Java standard library using formal methods [153]).

Architecture and Organization Teach to validate the accuracy of hardware designs and that the interface behaviour of (software and hardware) components in architectural designs adhere to their specifications (e.g., by verifying security requirements in hardware security architectures [124]).

Artificial Intelligence Teach to capture the assumptions of the designs of deep neural networks as used in large language models as well as their verification or counterexample-based retraining (e.g., with model checking or interactive theorem proving [71]).

Parallel and Distributed Computing Teach how to understand and justify the correctness of systems in the presence of the topics addressed in this knowledge area (e.g., program parallelisation, atomicity, concurrency, progress, deadlocks, faults, safety, and liveness), which in essence lists formal methods as a prerequisite (viz., logic, discrete mathematics, and software engineering foundations).

Security Teach how to understand vulnerabilities of, and threats against, software systems, algorithms and protocols, ensuring resilience against attacks and providing assurance of security properties (including concepts like privacy, cryptography, and encryption properties [96]).

Software Development Fundamentals Teach to reason (at least informally) about the correctness of programs (e.g., by specifying requirements and justifying why these are met by the proposed program [230]) and to understand how algorithms impact the performance of programs.

Databases Teach description logic for reasoning on data management (e.g., expressing ontologies, integrating multiple data sources, and expressing and evaluating queries [59]).

Software Engineering Teach formal methods, which is actually recommended in this knowledge area (defined as “mathematically rigorous mechanisms to apply to software, from specification to verification”) as a non-core knowledge unit with suggested learning outcomes like “describe the role formal specification and analysis techniques can play in the development of complex software and compare their use as validation and verification techniques with testing” and “apply formal specification and analysis techniques to software designs and programs with low complexity,” while testing is the primary validation technique in other modules. As mentioned in Section 2.1, formal methods and testing are not mutually exclusive.

We believe in the importance of formal methods, and in particular of the capacity to abstract and mathematical reasoning that are taught as part of any formal methods course, as fundamental Computer Science skills that industry would profit from when hiring computer scientists. This is

⁴⁴<https://csed.acm.org/>

⁴⁵<https://csed.acm.org/knowledge-areas/>

highly relevant, since we have seen that formal methods are becoming widely applied in industry. In Section 3, we have provided evidence of formal-methods applications in industry through papers and testimonies from representatives who, either directly or indirectly, use or have used formal methods in their industrial project endeavours. Importantly, they are spread geographically, including Europe, Asia, North and South America, and involve well-known worldwide companies such as Alstom, Amazon, ASML, Bang & Olufsen, Boeing, Collins Aerospace, Embraer, Facebook, Google, Huawei, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Motorola, Oracle, Siemens, and Volvo. The current offering of formal methods in Computer Science education is inadequate because every Computer Science graduate needs to be educated in formal methods, since they can support algorithmic problem solving, model-driven engineering, requirements engineering, security, software architecture, software product lines, and many more areas of Computer Science, and they are applicable in numerous industrial domains, not limited to safety-critical applications.

This is confirmed by the aforementioned recent survey among 130 experts in formal methods, which also contained five questions on formal methods in education [138, Section 6: Formal Methods in Education]. The first two questions addressed the course level and the level of importance, while further questions concerned the content of such courses. In particular, the first question asked the experts to indicate the most suitable place for formal methods in an ideal teaching curriculum: *When and where should formal methods be taught?* A convincing 79.2% responded “in bachelor courses at the university.” The second question asked the experts about the situation of formal methods in Computer Science education: *What is your opinion on the level of importance currently attributed to teaching of formal methods at universities?* Exactly 50% responded “not enough attention” and 31.5% responded “sufficient attention, but scattered all over.” These results indicate a consensus about the essential role of education to give the next generations of students a sufficient background and practical experience in formal methods. This is of paramount importance because in the same survey, 71.5% of the respondents identified as the single most important *limiting factor for a wider adoption of formal methods by industry* the fact that “engineers lack proper training in formal methods” [138, Section 5: Formal Methods in Industry]. This conclusion is shared by a recent white paper [82], which advocates “the inclusion of a compulsory formal methods course in Computer Science and software engineering curricula” based on the observation that “there is a lack of Computer Science graduates who are qualified to apply formal methods in industry,” and by a recent textbook [268] on formal methods in software engineering, which claims that “in computer science and software engineering education, Formal Methods usually play a minor role only.” In the context of safety-critical and mission-critical applications, a very recent paper recognizes “an urgent need to emphasize and integrate Formal Methods into the undergraduate curriculum in Computer Science in the United States,” since “the lack of a well-structured exposure to formal methods is a serious shortcoming in our computing curricula” [261]. The authors also provide several concrete suggestions for introducing the concepts and use of formal methods into existing Computer Science curricula (e.g., Data Structures, Logic circuit design, Concepts of programming languages, Software Engineering). “We cannot expect graduates to become experts in program verification as professionals if they never encountered the ideas as students.” The authors of [105] propose to approach formal methods already in basic education (i.e., primary and secondary education) through five fundamental notions (viz., specification, formalization, modelling, verification, and reasoning) and they report on their experience in doing so (by means of gamification of transformation rules of typed graph grammars using Pac-Man).

Support for teachers is available, for instance through recent textbooks on formal methods [43, 175, 240, 246, 268] and advanced lectures on formal methods [44–48, 263], but also via Formal

Methods Europe (FME)⁴⁶ and the ERCIM working group on Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (FMICS).⁴⁷

5 Conclusion

We have demonstrated that formal methods are important to quite a number of industry segments, not limited to safety-critical domains, and we have made a case for the inclusion of formal methods as a separate topic in Computer Science education. This strengthens the evidence put forward in [70] for claiming that formal methods should be taught as a separate topic in undergraduate curricula, not only because of their importance in industry but also because of the discipline they instil in students as they learn to develop systems through abstraction and mathematical reasoning, as demonstrated in [118, 261]. Moreover, we have shown that this can be done without displacing the other “engineering” aspects of Computer Science already widely accepted as essential. On the contrary, we have shown that formal methods have the potential to support and strengthen at least 8 of the 17 knowledge areas of CS2023.

The formal methods community recently received support from a rather unexpected source. The White House advocates the use of formal methods over testing for demonstrating the correctness of software and considers it vital to make formal methods widely accessible to accelerate broad adoption [297, Part II: Securing the Building Blocks of Cyberspace—Formal Methods]: “Given the complexities of code, testing is a necessary but insufficient step in the development process to fully reduce vulnerabilities at scale. If correctness is defined as the ability of a piece of software to meet a specific security requirement, then it is possible to demonstrate correctness using mathematical techniques called *formal methods*. These techniques, often used to prove a range of software outcomes, can also be used in a cybersecurity context and are viable even in complex environments like space. While formal methods have been studied for decades, their deployment remains limited; further innovation in approaches to make formal methods widely accessible is vital to accelerate broad adoption. Doing so enables formal methods to serve as another powerful tool to give software developers greater assurance that entire classes of vulnerabilities, even beyond memory safety bugs, are absent.” This report highlights *static analysis* and *model checkers* as specific examples of types of formal methods.

To conclude, creating correct software is an engineering problem and software development should therefore be an engineering discipline. Mastering the complexity of software systems is a formidable intellectual challenge and Computer Science graduates need to understand the powerful formal methods and tools that are available. Then they can choose the right technique and tool for each task and with suitable humility deserve the title of *Software Engineer*.

Acknowledgments

Sadly, our co-author Rance Cleaveland passed away unexpectedly on March 27, 2024, during the revision of this paper. Rance has written most of the Introduction and he was very passionate about this paper:

“I wanted to, on the one hand, give a sense of the history of formal methods but also tie the rest of the paper together. I also wanted to make a pedagogical point, which I don’t see right now in the paper: that students who learn formal methods are better developers, because they learn to think about correctness while they are building systems.”

“As to whether the point that FM is only for safety-critical system comes out in the rest of the paper, I would say the safety-critical aspects still seem to dominate a bit, although other industrial

⁴⁶<https://fmeurope.org/>

⁴⁷<https://fmics.inria.fr/>

applications also are apparent. However, having said that, I think the ACM CS curricula committee’s position is, frankly, silly. There are lots of things we teach in CS curricula that don’t have “broad industrial relevance”: functional programming, computer architecture / organization, O(-) notation, etc. And yet these topics are not controversial, because there is an agreement that students who learn these topics are better computer scientists. Even if FM is *only* for safety-critical systems, there is a great case to make for its inclusion in CS curricula.”

We honor Rance with this paper and acknowledge his seminal contributions to formal methods and concurrency [284], in particular the development and application of process-algebraic modelling and verification techniques and tools, like the Concurrency Workbenches [91–93].

Several domain experts provided us with useful information or feedback. June Andronick from Proofcraft (Australia) checked the references to the formal verification of the seL4 general-purpose commercial microkernel. Gunnar Smith from Prover Technology (Sweden) provided many meaningful experiences from an engineer’s perspective and successful stories of Prover using formal methods. Finally, we thank Manfred Broy and the four anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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